Since the introduction of new agreements and institutional arrangements in 1995, the international rules of the WTO have exerted growing influence over the shape of domestic regulatory systems. This development can be characterized as part of the broader phenomenon of 'global governance ', which has seen an increasing range of regulatory functions -traditionally exercised by national governments -drawn into the international domain. Button examines one crucial area of regulatory activity impacted by this trend -that of health regulation. With growth of the global market, many domestic health regulations are now subject to WTO oversight pursuant to the GATT, TBT Agreement and science-based disciplines of the SPS Agreement. Button focuses particularly on the latter, emphasizing that the SPS Agreement moves beyond the traditional non-discrimination principle of the GATT to encompass health regulations that are 'unnecessary ' in the sense of lacking 'sufficient ' scientific support.
Based upon her analysis of relevant WTO case law, Button identifies a fundamental 'tension ' between the need for health regulation to embrace 'non-scientific ' factors (such as cultural traditions and public risk perceptions) and the 'lynchpin' scientific justification principle of WTO disciplines like the SPS Agreement. Scientific uncertainty further complicates the regulatory picture, but Button rejects solutions calling for application of the ' precautionary principle' (on the basis that the principle is open to
Introduction
Joost Pauwelyn has written an extensive and thought-provoking treatise on the interaction of norms in public international law (PIL), in particular between norms of World Trade Organization (WTO) and non-WTO norms, through a conceptual lens of 'conflict'.
1 His main argument is non-WTO norms should be able to 'trump' WTO norms under certain circumstances. After framing the concept of norm conflict in PIL (Chapter 1), and defining the nature of WTO law (' reciprocal ' obligations) vis-à -vis that of other branches of PIL such as human rights and international environmental law (' integral ' obligations) (Chapter 2), the book unfolds its conflict thesis, including hierarchy of sources (Chapter 3), two mutually exclusive modes of norm interaction, which are accumulation and conflict (Chapter 4), conflict avoidance (Chapter 5), and conflict resolution (Chapters 6 and 7). The final chapter attempts to apply the conflict thesis developed in previous chapters to the specific situation of WTO dispute settlement. This review will chiefly focus on the nature, or identity, of the WTO as it is described and defined by Pauwelyn when he addresses the norm conflict between WTO rules and non-WTO rules. In this treatise, WTO's identity is dealt with in two ways: first, in relations to public international law (external identity); second, within itself or among its Members (internal identity). Importantly, Pauwelyn's position on these two facets of WTO's identity is inextricably linked with his own conceptualization of 'conflict ' itself, which will be discussed below.
Conflict thesis
Pauwelyn adopts a broad concept of conflict, which contrasts with a traditional view (narrow concept) envisioned by Wilfred Jenks and Wolfram Karl, i.e., a collision of mutually exclusive obligations in two norms.
2 Therefore, non-conflict interactions between/among different norms under the narrow view may nonetheless fall within the rubric of conflict in this book.
3 In a sense, conflict is a conceptual tool with which Pauwelyn examines an interrelation or interaction of different norms of public international law. In response to this broad scope of conflict, he introduces comprehensive conflict-avoidance techniques 4 as well as its resolutions. 5 In sum, he captures a broad range of problems and also offers a broad range of answers.
Pauwelyn begins his analysis by configuring a universe of PIL, especially in relation to the law of WTO. He views the WTO law as a mere 'branch' 6 or a 'sub-system' 7 of PIL. As a branch or a sub-system, the WTO does, or must, interact with other braches or sub-systems of PIL, such as human rights treaties (HR) and international environmental agreements (IE). The WTO is neither a 'closed legal circuit ' nor a 'selfcontained' regime.
8 Non-WTO norms residing in a broader terrain of PIL should be able to 'prevail ' over WTO norms in various situations of conflict. 9 What facilitates non-WTO norms' prevalence over or penetration into WTO norms is Pauwelyn's unique position on the nature of WTO rights and obligations. Based on his rather unsophisticated observation that ' trade is and remains a bilateral happening', 10 he concludes that the nature of WTO norms is 'bilateral/reciprocal' in accordance with its goal to ensure bilateral market access, despite a collective effect of trade.
11 Therefore, as 2 Ibid., [169] [170] Ibid., at 184-188 (conflict scenarios 2-4). 4 Ibid., ch. 5. 5 Ibid., chs. 6-7. 6 Ibid., [25] [26] Ibid., at 9. 8 Ibid., at 35. 9 Ibid., at 316. 10 Ibid., at 71 (emphasis added). 11 Ibid., at 72. a legal system the WTO is distinguishable from other branches of PIL such as HR and IE whose rights and obligations are 'integral ' in that they pursue 'collective/universal ' values or 'global commons'. 12 Finally, he views that:
A breach of WTO trade rules may affect a number of members individually, but it does not amount to an offense of the collective right or conscience of all state parties, the way that a human rights breach does.
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A corollary of this bilateralism/reciprocalism can be found in a somewhat oxymoronic thesis of the 'legality of inter se agreements deviating from the WTO treaty'. 
Critique of premises
As discussed above, Pauwelyn predicates his thesis largely on the ' bilateral/reciprocal' nature of WTO norms, which, at least to him, originates from a material aspect of international trade (bilateral happening) as well as its goal (bilateral market access). This rather inferior legal status of the WTO vis-à -vis other braches of PIL, such as HR and IE, which enjoy ' integral ' nature of rights and obligations as they pursue universal goals, is naturally prone to inter-branch conflicts which Pauwelyn envisions. It also tends to justify the penetration of these lofty norms into the humble law of WTO. However, these fundamental premises that Pauwelyn employs are hard to accept. First of all, Pauwelyn's simplistic diagram of international trade suffers from anachronism. Trade as a bilateral happening might have gathered certain currencies in the era of a Treaty on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in the nineteenth century, or even in the earlier days of the old GATT consisting of 'contracting ' parties. However, the WTO as it stands today is a full-blown 'multilateral' trading system in which not only Members but also individual economic players retain their own stakes for its stability and predictability, as the Section 301 panel eloquently portrayed.
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Moreover, Pauwelyn argues that 'trade and the liberalization of trade is not a value ' 12 Ibid., at 72-73. 13 Ibid., at 72 (emphasis original). 14 Ibid., at 315. 15 '7.76 The security and predictability in question are of ''the multilateral trading system. '' The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of security and predictability affects mostly these individual operators. ' WTO Panel Report on United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (27 January 2000).
unlike the protection of human rights or the environment. 16 Here, Pauwelyn is oblivious of the solemn historical fact that the very genesis of GATT was attributed to tragic economic balkanization in the interwar period which precipitated the Second World War. 17 If we agree that the prevention of war serves the protection and promotion of human rights, trade liberalization itself may claim its own value. Likewise, an 'integrated, more viable, and durable' multilateral trading system 18 itself is a ' global commons '. If one accepts arguendo Pauwelyn's premise that trade only realizes a 'compilation of individual welfare increases ', 19 would not such a compilation itself, if global, be sufficient to entitle WTO norms as being collective and universal?
Unlike what Pauwelyn observes, 20 rules of origin serve no confirmation of bilateral nature of WTO obligations. Rules of origin attest an imperfectness of the multilateral trading system at the current stage. A main function of rules of origin is to single out specific countries to either advantage or disadvantage them vis-à -vis the rest of WTO Members. 21 In other words, trading nations need rules of origin when they extend preferential tariffs to a selected group of trading partners or impose antidumping duties on products from them. Yet, the underlying rationale of rules of origin derives from exceptions (in case of regional trading blocs) or abnormalities (in case of antidumping) of general trade rules, i.e., non-discrimination. Note that neither the US nor the European Union (EU) need rules of origin in their internal trade. If the world becomes one big customs union through perfect trade liberalization, we would no longer need rules of origin. In other words, rules of origin do not concern the nature of WTO obligations but are a mere manifestation of an imperfect trading system as of now. This observation gains strength when considering the 'spaghetti bowl' phenomenon of rules of origin in regional trading blocs, which plague the current multilateral trading system.
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Pauwelyn also assigns bilateral aspects of WTO retaliation (countermeasures) to the bilateral nature of WTO obligations.
23 Yet, the bilateral nature of retaliation does not necessarily reflect the bilateral nature of WTO obligations, but merely a remedial consequence of adversarial adjudication. Even if the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adjudicates a case on human rights violation between two parties, countermeasures as a remedy cannot but help being bilateral at the end. Furthermore, retaliation is far from being an ideal form of remedy. It may be self-inflicting in that it hurts consumers of the retaliating country and is also ineffective in that rich countries are 16 Ibid.,  Turning to the titular 'integral ' obligations in HR or IE, they are not always so. Devilish details of HR or IE would reveal the fact that not every item in the list of human rights deserves the crown of erga omnes. Most human rights treaties have a limited number of signatories. In fact, more items in that list are controversial in their ontology than others which receive a wide consensus and approval.
26 Likewise, a number of human rights treaties have not even been ratified.
27 Even if they are ratified, 'reservations,' which are nothing but privatized contracting-out from those integral obligations, abound.
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Pauwelyn offers a practical solution to norm conflict between WTO norms and non-WTO norms via inter se modifications under two requirements, which are (i) 'they are not explicitly prohibited in the WTO treaty' and (ii) 'they do not affect the rights of other WTO members'.
29 Although these requirements appear fair and plausible at first glance, a closer examination soon reveals that they are nearly impossible to be met. First, those modifications are by definition ' deviations' from the WTO obligations, such as GATT Articles III (National Treatment) and XI (Prohibition of Trade Restriction), and therefore are ' explicitly prohibited,' unless they are justified. If those modifications are ever exempted under GATT Article XX, they are neither deviations nor explicitly prohibited ; hence no conflict to be resolved at all.
30 Therefore, the first requirement can never be met. Second, in this highly interdependent world, any inter se modification is likely to affect third parties, one way or another. Consider the following example. Suppose that the US and Mexico signs a bilateral treaty which penalizes low labor standards through an import ban. If this bilateral treaty is an inter se modification, the US can halt the imports of Mexican toys when they are allegedly manufactured in a condition where a right to strike is not fully protected. Yet, what if these toys are actually produced in a Mexican factory built by Korean investors ? Would not such modification affect rights of other WTO member like Korea ? One must notice that globalization is testimonial to a 'collective' nature of WTO rights and obligations.
Pauwelyn believes that making the WTO system porous via these inter se modifications is a logical step to reject the ' self-contained' regime. (2004)).
29 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, supra note 1, at 316. 30 Ibid., at 162-163, 185 ('Conflict arises only when the question of whether the two norms are in a 'ruleexception ' relationship is not explicitly regulated in either norm.').
system does not necessarily mean that non-WTO norms should trump WTO norms through such mechanism as modifications. Borrowing Pauwelyn's own analysis, 'fall-back, ' i.e., interpretive references to non-WTO norms, also contributes to an openness of the WTO system 31 without necessarily relying on modifications. Unlike what Pauwelyn criticizes, Gabrielle Marceau is right when she argues that 'WTO obligations are always the same for all Members ' to the extent that such position does not tolerate any bilateral modifications of WTO rights and obligations.
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Pauwelyn also overlooks negative potentials that his conflict rules may cause to the WTO system. First, under certain circumstances, WTO's subordination to HR or IE in the name of conflict resolution may motivate, or be motivated from, a 'disguised ' form of discrimination. Domestic industries often capitalize on moralistic streaks that HR or IE may symbolize in an attempt to justify sheer protectionism. Under these circumstances, conflict rules, as Pauwelyn posits, may open the Pandora's Box. Second, higher regulatory standards are largely infeasible to poor nations for their technical and financial shortage. It is rather nonsensical to restrict their imports and hamper their development through applying non-WTO norms in such areas as human health and safety. One might be inclined to exempt these poor countries from such regulatory burden. Then, could the conflict rule still achieve what it aims ? What if rich countries who are bound by certain HR or IE via modifications build a factory in one of those poor countries, manufacture products, and export them to another rich country as the poor country's origin? Third, even if the WTO yields to non-trade norms, its tribunal (a panel or the Appellate Body) should ' investigate' facts and evidences before it 'applies ' these non-WTO norms to the WTO case in question. Could and should the WTO tribunal agonize over those intensive factual questions such as a violation of a right to strike or exhaustion of CO2 emission limit in specific cases ? Lastly, but not least, disputes involving HR or IE can often be politically combustible and turn into the so-called 'wrong cases ', 33 in which situation putative non-trade values are not safeguarded, while the WTO's integrity is severely undermined.
Toward an identity formation of the WTO
Pauwelyn's definition of conflict, as is employed in his treatise, captures a close encounter by the WTO with non-WTO norms. In fact, he begins his book with the following question :
How should a WTO panel react when faced with the argument that an allegedly WTO inconsistent trade restriction is justified under an environmental treaty, IMF rules or customary international law?
In other words, this encounter is at the heart of his treaties and he characterizes it as 'conflict '. To define a situation as a conflict is naturally followed by the next step of 'resolving' such conflict via conflict rules, which are not WTO norms themselves but other rules under PIL. Under these conflict rules of his own prescription, various non-WTO norms may penetrate into and prevail over WTO norms. Then, the WTO's identity as a 'trade ' organization might be confused, diffused, and finally lost.
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The foregoing apprehension does not endorse the thesis that the WTO is a selfcontained regime. The WTO, of course, must be open and communicate with other legal terrains, if it remains a viable organization. No system is an island, and it is especially so in this highly integrated and interdependent world that we live in (globalization) as well as the very subject-matter before us (international trade). Nonetheless, while the WTO interacts with, responds to, and is even influenced by its legal environment to remain open and linked, it must maintain its autonomy or 'autopoietic ' status by upholding its legal integrity or ' operative closure'.
35 In other words, those human rights law or international environmental law could and should not become the law of WTO per se, although we all acknowledge their paramount values. These non-trade values could and should only be addressed by the WTO itself through 'altering ' its own internal legal and institutional choices in the course of its evolution.
36 What is inconsistent with the WTO rules cannot be WTO legal through any devices such as inter se modifications.
Critically, however, if we re-characterize Pauwelyn's broad notion of conflict as 'linkage' between WTO and non-WTO values, which has thus far captured a good deal of scholarly attention, 37 the WTO can still remain open and connected to its environment. By reaching out to non-WTO values such as the protection of the environment or human health, the linkage narratives can cope with the reconciliation between trade and non-trade values from the WTO's standpoint, not from the PIL's, thereby preserving the WTO's autonomy, and, most importantly, its 'identity '. The WTO's identity has been formed and transformed since its past life, i.e., the GATT 1947. As a post-war rehabilitation plan for international economic order, the GATT was understandably obsessed with trade liberalization, in particular tariff reduction, to prevent the recurrence of prewar economic balkanization.
38 Thus, the GATT was originally designed as a multi-party contract for reciprocal tariff reduction. In earlier days, legal obligations were a mere tool for preserving a balance of concessions (give-and-takes) in tariff negotiations.
39 Yet, a half-century evolution of the GATT, both jurisprudential and institutional, transformed this provisional contract into a full-blown legal system, i.e., the WTO. The very telos of the WTO, such as 'sustainable development ' and/or an ' integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system,' in fact connotes the linkage theme. If the WTO remains closed and 34 In this essay, I use certain concepts in developmental psychology, such as ' identity diffusion ' and 'identity formation ', which were largely developed by Erik Erikson, only in a metaphorical sense. See Susan Harter, 'Self and Identity Development ', in S. Shirley Feldman and Glen R. Elliott, At the Threshold : The Developing Adolescent (1990) disconnected from other (non-trade) values and concerns, its existence would be unsustainable and thus threatened. This identity-defining transformation of telos in the history of GATT/WTO has left its mark in the WTO's jurisprudence or interpretative practice. In fact, the broad scope of conflict which Pauwelyn adopts can eventually be solved by interpretation. Treaty interpretation is a serious enterprise transcending mere clarification of lexicographical meanings of treaty provisions. Although Pauwelyn himself recognizes interpretation as a conflict-avoidance tool, he maintains a rather narrow version of interpretation tantamount to strict textualism.
40 According to him, this narrow interpretation may avoid apparent conflicts, but still cannot resolve genuine conflicts whose solution requires other disciplines of international law such as the law of treaties and state responsibilities. However, interpretation often involves a 'teleological' undertaking that invokes the objective and purpose (telos) of a given legal system. The teleological interpretation breathes a new life into often ambiguous and ambivalent treaty provisions, which are by and large a product of compromise at the time of negotiation.
41 If we appreciate this teleological interpretation, the titular conflict situations, be they a conflict between WTO norms or a conflict between WTO norms and non-WTO norms, can be addressed without recourse to separate conflict disciplines. In other words, in accordance with the telos of the WTO, a panel or the Appellate Body will eventually interpret away any alleged conflict situations that may arise in the WTO disputes.
Certainly, the old hermeneutics under the old GATT is strikingly different from the new one under the WTO in dealing with the linkage issues, i.e., reconciliation between trade and non-trade values. Grounded on a pro-trade bias, the old GATT panels often downplayed domestic regulatory (non-trade) concerns. For instance, in Thai Cigarette (1990) a WTO panel struck down the Thai government's ban on foreign tobaccos as a violation of GATT Article XI, which generally prohibits any type of border measures restricting trade. Under GATT Article XX defense, Thai government highlighted Thailand's unique situation as a developing country, which would confront grave public health concern once it allowed unchecked flux of foreign cigarettes produced by big multinational tobacco companies.
42 Yet, the panel rejected this defense and ruled that Thailand should have sought the 'least trade-restrictive ' means instead of the import ban to be qualified for being 'necessary ' to protect human health under GATT Article XX, Paragraph (b).
43 Under this biased hermeneutics, the GATT could not fully address non-trade values such as public health. The Thai Cigarette panel even ignored expert opinions by the authority in this field, i.e., the World Health Organization (WHO). 191, 200-201 (1999) .
44 Cho, Linkage, supra note 37, at 673.
However, under the new WTO the Appellate Body has more sensitized non-trade values by providing ample maneuvering leeway to regulating governments pursuing these values. In paradigmatic cases such as Gasoline (1996) 45 and Shrimp-Turtle (1998), 46 the Appellate Body, under GATT Article XX, gave domestic regulators broad deference in establishing the content of regulations, while it focused on the manner as to how they were applied.
47 In these cases, the Appellate Body no longer second-guessed the foundation of domestic regulations unlike Thai Cigarette (1990). Such hermeneutical turn tends to advance the WTO's openness by allowing governments to freely choose policy tools in achieving non-trade values through domestic measures or even non-trade treaties.
The Shrimp-Turtle (1998) is a case in point. In this case, the Appellate Body approved the legitimacy of the US environmental measure (Section 609) to protect the endangered species, i.e., sea turtle, under GATT Article XX, Paragraph (g). The complainants claimed that sea turtles are not 'exhaustible natural resources ' under this paragraph which was originally concerned with ' finite resources such as minerals, rather than biological or renewable resources '.
48 Noting that this paragraph was drafted 50 years ago, the Appellate Body emphasized that its interpretation should reflect the 'contemporary ' environmental concern, such as the protection of sea turtles.
49 The Appellate Body based its 'evolutionary' approach on the new telos of the WTO, i.e., 'sustainable development '. 51 In sum, the Appellate Body acknowledged and endorsed the non-trade value of environmental protection in interpreting trade rules.
In contrast, the Appellate Body concentrates its interpretive energy on the manner in which the regulating government executes measures of its own choice.
52 This is an important 'constitutional ' methodology under which a centripetal force of free trade (trade value) is harmonized with a centrifugal force of regulatory autonomy (non-trade value) toward a legal, institutional equilibrium. It is the same interpretive technique which is witnessed in other polities, including the US.
53 Interestingly, a legal basis of this manner-oriented interpretation is nothing but 'general principles of law', such as 45 The case for the WTO's identity formation, not identity diffusion, in its interaction with non-WTO norms goes beyond the foregoing hermeneutical dimension and stretches to an 'institutional ' domain. Simply, no narratives, and thus no nomos, 54 corresponding to human rights and international environment exist within the WTO, which might have justified a direct normative control of the WTO by non-WTO norms. The GATT/WTO acquis, comprising not only jurisprudence but also other rich institutional memory, does not truly connote and denote particularities of human rights or international environmental law. This is one of the main reasons why WTO panels and the Appellate Body may treat non-WTO norms and their performance/ operation in other terrain of international law as 'facts ', 55 which may be a basis for their legal reasoning, but not as directly applicable and binding 'norms ' per se. To wit, non-WTO norms could be supplemental or complementary, yet not supplant to WTO norms. Certainly, this institutional deficiency within the WTO vis-à -vis non-WTO norms can be addressed by engaging in a cross-institutional dialogue with other international organizations in the form of committees (e.g., the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment), agreements (e.g., WTO-IMF Cooperation Agreement), or harmonization (e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 3). Admittedly, these institutional aspects related to norm conflict are not covered by this book.
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Conclusion
Pauwelyn's book deserves many credits for its unique value and contributions. It touches on an important subject matter in the area of public international law. Undoubtedly, it is a laudable attempt to define conflict of norms in public international law, especially between WTO norms and non-WTO norms, in times of globalization and growing interdependence. The book is a product of serious enterprise, both in its inclusiveness and profundity. It is very well researched and rich in citations of jurisprudence and literatures.
It is not my intention to trivialize possible, and even desirable, nutritional inputs or contributions from non-WTO norms to WTO norms which can provide opportunities for cross-fertilization and help better reconcile trade and regulatory goals. Yet, such cross-fertilization or reconciliation should be the WTO's call. No other treaties should replace the WTO in that call. After all, it is all about 'trade and environment (human rights) ', not 'environment (human rights) and trade'. In the absence of an Austinian World Government, horizontal conflict of norms between the WTO and other branches of PIL may be inevitable. Pauwelyn's solution for such conflict leans toward PIL as long as he is willing to sacrifice the autonomy of the WTO system to outsource PIL.
57 However, WTO norms exist on their own just as HR and IE claim their own legal distinctiveness. While Pauwelyn's thesis of conflict resolution might turn the WTO porous beyond his wildest dream, at the same time it certainly risks weakening the WTO system through osteoporosis and thus encroaching upon the WTO's identity. Agricultural trade has a direct impact on households, communities, and entire nations in the developing world that depend on agricultural production for their economic survival. More than half of the developing world's population and 73% of the developing world's poor reside in rural areas. 1 Approximately 2.5 billion rural dwellers in developing countries rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, and over 50 developing countries depend on the export of three or fewer agricultural products for a significant portion of their foreign exchange earnings.
2 These countries, communities and households are highly vulnerable to volatility in world market prices for agricultural commodities and to the declining terms of trade for agricultural products relative to manufactured goods.
3 Long-term and short-term declines in agricultural commodity prices can undermine the livelihoods of farmers in the developing world, and can deprive agro-exporting developing countries of the foreign exchange earnings necessary for productive investment and for the purchase of manufactured products and food not produced domestically.
4 Agricultural trade and production patterns are influenced by agricultural trade policy in both developed and developing countries. Thus, agricultural trade policy can play an important role in economic development and poverty alleviation in much of the developing world.
Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries examines key issues in agricultural trade policy that are of particular significance to developing countries. Published by the World Bank, the book contains contributions from a variety of 57 'The effect of the approach suggested here, that WTO rules would apply differently to different WTO members depending on whether or not they have accepted other non-WTO rules, may complicate the matrix of rights and obligations between WTO members. ' Ibid., economists, including many present and former World Bank economists. The book is divided into two parts. Part I provides background and context by describing global agricultural trade flows since the 1980s and by examining a variety of issues relevant to agricultural trade policy, including agricultural protectionism in both developed and developing countries, the effect of industrialized country trade preferences for agricultural commodities from certain developing countries, the impact on developing countries of developed country food safety and agricultural health standards, and the likely consequences of agricultural trade liberalization. Part II presents a commodity-by-commodity analysis of trade and domestic agricultural policy in both producing and consuming countries for those commodities of particular economic importance to developing countries (sugar, dairy, rice, wheat, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, fruits and vegetables, and seafood products). The book's strength is its painstaking research and detailed and exhaustive analysis of agricultural trade and production policies in a variety of countries and across a variety of commodities. The book provides a clear explanation of the market distortions caused by agricultural protectionism and of the distributional impacts of agricultural trade liberalization.
The book points out that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture did not result in meaningful reductions in agricultural subsidies and import barriers in industrialized countries. By contrast, most developing countries opened their markets to foreign competition beginning in the 1980s. Certain middle-income developing countries then reacted to this imbalance by imposing agricultural tariffs to protect their own farmers from the influx of cheaper, subsidized exports from industrialized countries. This pattern of protectionism impedes trade flows, depresses world agricultural commodity prices, rewards inefficient producers, and depresses the income of developing country farmers by limiting their access to developed country markets. One of the book's key conclusions is that, despite the heterogeneity of the commodity markets studied in Part II, the elimination of agricultural subsidies and import barriers in both developed and developing countries would likely benefit developing countries by increasing agricultural incomes, alleviating rural poverty, and capitalizing on developing countries' comparative advantage in agricultural production. Indeed, if all regions of the world were to eliminate agricultural subsidies and import barriers, the global income gain projected for 2015 is estimated to be $265 billion, with nearly half of that gain accruing to developing countries (primarily middle-income developing countries).
The book's weakness is its failure to integrate its analysis and recommendations into broader debates about economic development, especially the relationship among agricultural production, industrial policy, and environmental protection. While there is a rich interdisciplinary literature addressing these issues, the book confines itself to extolling the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization without probing the long-term economic and ecological implications of its policy recommendations.
First, the book fails to evaluate the long-term effects on economic development of specialization in agro-export production. The book mentions several times that the most successful developing countries did not rely on agricultural exports, 5 and explains that 'a development strategy based on agricultural commodity exports is likely to be impoverishing in the current agricultural policy environment'. 6 However, the book neglects to fully explain the implications of these observations for its policy recommendations or to reconcile these observations with decades of World Bank policy advice promoting agricultural specialization to developing countries as a means of generating export earnings.
The deterioration in the terms of trade for agricultural products vis-à -vis manufactured goods, noted approximately 50 years ago by economists Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, has been confirmed by subsequent data, 7 and has caused many developing countries severe economic losses and increasing debt burdens.
8 Recent studies on Sub-Saharan Africa have sharply criticized the neoliberal economic reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as loan conditions on the ground that these reforms perpetuated poverty by promoting 'comparative advantage' in raw material and primary product exports in lieu of encouraging the economic diversification and industrialization vital to economic development.
9 Indeed, the promotion by the IMF and the World Bank of agro-export production as a means of generating the revenue with which to service the foreign debt had the perverse consequence of depressing developing country export earnings by glutting world agricultural markets and causing agricultural commodity prices to decline.
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Curiously, the book does not discuss the historic role of the World Bank and the IMF in promoting the agro-export-based development strategies that the book now finds impoverishing. Moreover, it is unclear whether the book's authors believe that eliminating agricultural subsidies and import barriers will reverse the long-term decline in the terms of trade for agricultural commodities relative to manufactured goods and make agro-export specialization a viable development strategy. In light of the importance of these issues to developing countries, the book's failure to address them in a clear and explicit way is troubling.
Second, the book fails to address the economic consequences of the concessions that developing countries must make in order to persuade industrialized countries to reduce their hefty agricultural subsidies and import barriers. Many of these concessions, such as enforcing industrialized country intellectual property rights, may be very costly to developing countries.
11 Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements severely constrain the ability of developing countries to utilize the protectionist tools historically employed by the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of Taiwan and South Korea to promote industrialization -such as infant industry protection (through tariffs and subsidies), regulation of foreign investment (including local content and local majority ownership requirements), and technology transfer requirements. 12 The book's analysis of the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization is incomplete without some discussion of the concessions and trade-offs that developing countries have accepted in the past and may be forced to accept in the future as the price of gaining access to agricultural markets in developed countries, particularly the cost of foregoing the development strategies that both industrialized countries and NICs have used to diversify and industrialize their economies.
Third, the book's analysis of the distribution of the benefits of trade liberalization between developed and developing countries neglects to take into account the dominant role of transnational corporations in global agricultural trade. Farmers and countries do not generally engage directly in international agricultural trade. 13 Rather, a handful of transnational corporations increasingly control almost every aspect of the production and distribution of agricultural commodities, from the sale of inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, machinery, and seeds) to the processing, shipping, and marketing of agricultural output.
14 The book emphasizes that virtually all of the income gains associated with agricultural trade liberalization are due to the removal of tariffs, thus facilitating access by developing country exporters to the markets of industrialized countries and middle-income developing countries.
15 However, since the export trade in developing countries is controlled by large, domestic agro-exporters and transnational corporations, it would be useful to know what percentage of the income gains from trade liberalization would actually accrue to large trading enterprises and what percentage would reach small farmers and other non-affluent residents of developing countries. 16 The book does not directly address this question. Furthermore, by focusing exclusively on distortions in world agricultural markets caused by government intervention, the book neglects to address the ways in which the market power of transnational agribusiness distorts agricultural input prices and prices for agricultural commodities 17 and the strategies that might be adopted to address this problem.
Finally, the book recognizes that agricultural trade liberalization will result in a shift of agricultural production from industrialized countries to developing countries, 18 and argues that the additional revenue resulting from trade liberalization will boost rural incomes in developing countries and provide agricultural producers with the means to 'modernize farming practices'. 19 Regrettably, the book neglects to address the long-term ecological and socioeconomic impact of the expansion of 'modern' exportoriented industrial agriculture in the developing world. This omission is unfortunate in light of the wide range of environmental problems triggered by chemical-intensive, monocultural farming practices in both developed and developing countries, including loss of agricultural productivity, soil degradation, depletion of freshwater reserves, loss of biodiversity, increased susceptibility to pest and disease infestation, harm to wildlife, and contamination of drinking water supplies by pesticides and fertilizers.
20 Increased agro-export production in developing countries is also likely to increase inequality by benefiting large-scale highly capitalized agricultural producers rather than the small farmers who comprise the rural poor.
21 Thus, the expansion of 'modern' industrial agriculture in the developing world is likely to be accompanied by environmental and social ' externalities' that are not addressed in the book's findings. While the book does mention the negative environmental and social externalities caused by the expansion of fishing and aquaculture, 22 these insights are not extended to the other commodities under study.
In sum, this book contains a wealth of detail on agricultural commodity markets and on trade and production practices in both developed and developing countries. However, the utility of this information is limited by the authors' failure to address a number of pressing questions related to agricultural trade policy that developing countries need to consider as they engage in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations and as they attempt to devise forward-looking, ecologically sustainable development strategies. The recent burgeoning literature surrounding the multifarious effects of globalization has a tendency to be either rather speculative in nature or to be gloomily resigned to a world in which the citizen will remain increasingly disempowered. The complex interplay between markets and law, public and private spheres (the 'horizontal dimension'), and the twin drives towards federalism and internationalism (the 'vertical dimension') are seldom examined together within the concrete framework provided by administrative law. Aman's important new book is exceptional in that it treats these issues from a legal-technical perspective yet does so with a clear and largely coherent agenda of democratic renewal. This synthesis is achieved 'from within ', focusing almost exclusively on what can be achieved internally. From this domestic perspective, Aman nevertheless seldom loses sight of the larger playing field and the 'embedding' of globalization as a result of both institutional changes, such as wrought by the WTO, and informal changes, such as those connected with privatization and the rise of multinational corporations.
Aman's study is built up from an analysis of the changing nature of judicial intervention (largely Supreme Court decisions) from the New Deal era through what he terms the 'environmental' period to the present 'globalization era'. What emerges from his careful deconstruction is not only that de-regulation is a legal and political choice with democratic consequences, but that the current era is characterized by an increasing judicial deference to the executive branch, which is often thereby able to bypass the democratic checks and balances associated with political debate in Congress. As a remedy to the increasing outsourcing of public services and deregulation more generally, he advocates the extension of accountability provided by the Administrative Procedures Act to private providers of public goods.
With regard to federalism, Aman rejects the standard model of democratic accountability that assumes both that decision making is more democratic the closer it is taken to the citizen and that therefore national intervention should be limited as far as is constitutionally permitted. Against the 'constitutionalisation' of federalism and the 'unbundling' of citizenship which the process of stratifying states' rights makes concrete, Aman convincingly argues that democracy sometimes needs to be nationalized in order for the full range of issues to be addressed by the citizen. In global terms, he rejects that democracy necessarily equals sovereignty at the international level since state sovereignty in external affairs often bypasses the internal democratic process altogether, despite the often dramatic domestic effects of international norms. He also rejects the dichotomy that either views the international arena in exclusively intergovernmental terms or which urges democratization at a global level.
Two main complementary themes emerge from his analysis: the interconnections of markets, law, and levels of governance and the underlying value of the national democratic process understood as citizenship participation. Thus the notions that de-regulation is non-political, that there is a ' zero-sum' relation between law and markets, or that a hierarchical model of the levels of governance is sufficient to analyze 'the globalizing state' are all convincingly refuted, with plenty of illustrative examples from the importation of prescription drugs from Canada to the privatization of prisons in the US.
Contributing significantly to the democracy deficit literature, Aman espouses a re-invigorated citizenship through domestic law reform, and is, perhaps surprisingly, sanguine about the future of the 'globalizing state'. This optimism points towards a possible weakness in the book, but nevertheless does not seriously detract from its overall achievements. The problem is not his tendency to view law-reform through rose-colored spectacles as such ; recognizing that law is not a neutral zone without adopting the often despairing tone suggested by much realist jurisprudence is welcome. Yet, whilst national law reform has a crucial role to play, it is not entirely apparent that piecemeal administrative change would be a sufficient response to the pressures of globalization. Moreover, the re-invigoration of citizenship perhaps needs to move beyond the parochialism that nationalism sometimes requires, otherwise the renewal of nationalist sentiment -even one rooted in civic responsibility -will re-emerge as democratic distortion at the international level. That Aman clearly recognizes global economic interconnectedness makes it only more surprising that his focus pays relatively scant attention to the role of transnational civil society and its part, if it has one, in taming the democracy deficit. Perhaps because of the large number of topics covered, The United States and the World Economy provides avenues for reflection rather than definitive answers. For instance, the book makes specific recommendations to expand the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, which provides support for workers who lose their jobs because of international trade competition. However, these recommendations do not draw enough on the rich empirical literature that evaluates labor market programs. For this very reason, the book fails to assess and compare the effectiveness of its different propositions.
However, the breadth of The United States and the World Economy is also one of its strengths. The meticulous description of key issues makes the book a reference for policymakers and anyone interested in foreign economic policy in the United States and abroad. More fundamentally, the book, taken as a whole, demonstrates the need for domestic action in order to address foreign economic challenges. Examples of such recommendations include expanding Trade Adjustment Assistance to gain political support for free trade, reducing budget deficits to correct the current account deficit, or raising the gasoline tax and encouraging alternative energy use to counter rising oil prices. The United States and the World Economy is important precisely because of this repeated call for domestic policies in order to complement international actions. Merger remedies are conditions imposed on a pending merger by regulatory agencies with a view to preventing anti-competitive consequences of the transaction. Divestiture of assets, mandatory access requirements, and non-discrimination obligations are prominent examples. Merger remedies thus enrich the toolbox available for merger regulation, and thereby permit competition authorities greater latitude in making merger control decisions. This book is a collection of articles on merger remedies from practical and theoretical perspectives. Its goal, as stated at the outset, is ' to launch rather than to complete the relevant research agenda, and in that regard the development of questions, idea and information for future research is the purpose ' (p. xxiii).
The book consists of three parts. The first part, entitled 'legal principles and procedures ', provides a detailed doctrinal and comparative review of merger remedies in the US and the European Union. The second part, more theoretically inclined, consists of economic analyses of different aspects of merger remedies. Noteworthy among the chapters included in this part are Joseph Farrel's intriguing analysis of negotiation and merger remedies and Patrick Rey's short but lucid discussion of the choice of remedies. The third part is dedicated to merger remedies in the high-tech industry. Here the reader will particularly benefit from Daniel Rubinfeld's review of access remedies in high-technology antitrust cases.
The book covers a wide gamut of issues, ideas, and questions. This indeed delivers on the book's promise to set forth an agenda for future research and provides an excellent introduction to merger remedies. The ambition to cover a lot of ground, however, is detrimental to the book for two reasons. First, the book's chapters vary substantially in quality. Whereas some chapters are illuminating and thought provoking, others are overly detailed and lack theoretical framework. Second, it is not uncommon that chapters digress from the issue of merger remedies by considering adjacent anti-trust issues raised by mergers. A conspicuous example is the chapter on the US merger policy by Thomas Leary. Finally, although the book's title refers to the US and the European Union, little is offered to shed light on the root causes of the differences between these legal systems with respect to merger remedies. It is regrettable that a thorough investigation of this question is not undertaken in the book. Despite its shortcomings, the book succeeds in bringing together different perspectives on the functions and effects of merger remedies, and thereby enriches the understanding of these legal tools. Among the several new legal disciplines in the field of international trade stemming from the Uruguay Round (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) still remains the most complex and unexplored. Krajewski's book, based on in-depth and wide-ranging research, represents a much welcome and indispensable tool for anyone wishing to further his or her understanding of the WTO legal framework for the liberalization and regulation of international trade in services.
As indicated in its title, the perspective taken by the book is to address the relationship between national regulation and trade liberalization in the field of services. The work explores the legal impact of the multilateral discipline provided by the GATS on national regulatory autonomy. Such a perspective represents one of the strengths of Krajewski's work. Since the GATS has been drafted and applied principally as an instrument for the liberalization of trade in services (where 'national regulation' is perceived as a trade barrier and ' legitimate public policies ' as mere grounds for justifying departures from GATS obligations in exceptional circumstances), the analysis of the impact of this agreement on national regulatory autonomy provides a novel and interesting perspective.
Additional strengths lie in the book's simple structure and detailed analysis of the GATS. The first two chapters deal with an introductory analysis of the relevant concepts (such as regulation, liberalization, etc.) as well as the regulatory policies and instruments employed by States to pursue a wide range of public policies. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine the structure and scope of GATS disciplines for trade liberalization, focusing on GATS provisions on market access, non-discrimination, transparency, domestic regulation, and general exceptions. Chapter 6 explores the impact of GATS on regulation in two specific services sectors : telecommunications and health services. In a concluding section, the author summarizes his main findings in seven theses. Worth highlighting are, for example, the meticulous analysis of the GATS exception for ' services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority ' (pp. 68-73) , the meaning of the market access obligation (pp. 81-94) , and the likeness issue with regard to the national treatment obligation (pp. 100-106).
Krajewski's work is full of insights: that the potential impact of GATS on national regulation does not depend solely on the structure and content of GATS law, but also on the structure and content of national regulatory systems (pp. xx and 191-196) ; that while the GATS allows for flexibility by permitting limitations on liberalization commitments, any limitation scheduled by a WTO member may come under pressure in future negotiations (p. 95); that the current political and ideological framework of the international trade regime seems particularly receptive to attempts to limit the full use of the flexibility and openness of WTO law (pp. xxi); and that each service sector has its peculiarities and should be approached and regulated differently from other sectors (p. 190) .
Perhaps, the most valuable insight that one is left with after reading Krajewski's book are the realizations that (a) the tension between liberalization and regulation cannot be understood as mono-dimensional in the sense that liberalization is carried out exclusively at the multilateral level while regulation takes place at the national level and (b) preserving national regulatory autonomy is not per se a good thing. Especially in the field of services, the line between trade liberalization and public policy regulation is conceptually difficult to draw and cannot therefore be neatly assigned to different levels of government. Moreover, while safeguarding legitimate public policy objectives must be a priority of any multilateral framework aimed at liberalizing/regulating trade in services, this does not exclude that imposing certain disciplines and benchmarks on how these objectives are pursued may represent a sound and legitimate policy option.
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